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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

QUAYLC CANNON, JR.; and SHELDON R.
BRBllSTER, on b~half. of themselves
and other parties s1m1larly situated,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
Case No. 16586

vs.
LEONARD w. Mc DONALD I in his original
capacity as Executive Director of the
Utah State Retirement Board, and the
utah State Retirement Board,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action requiring defendants to grant
le~islative

pensions to plaintiffs.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Court granted judgment to the plaintiffs

awarding

them a legislative pension based upon the stipulated facts and
the state's retirement laws.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmation of the judgment below.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties stipulated to certain facts before the
trial judge.
1.

They are essentially as follows:
The action is not being pursued as a class action,

but only on behalf of the named plaintiffs, Quayle Cannon, Jr,
and Sheldon Brewster (R.
2.

73).

Both Mr. Brewster and Mr. Cannon claimed benefits

under the retin,ment act. and those benefits were denieo by the
defendants (R. 73-74).
3.

The clairas of the plaintiffs are for legislative

service rendered prior to 1961.

Both plaintiffs served in the

legislature> for at least four years.

Mr. Cannon served from 1941

to 1945 (2 sessions of 2 years each).

Mr. Brewster served froo

1937 through 1943 and from 1957 through 1960 (4 sessions of 2
years each)
4.

(R. 74).
Other former legislators are receiving a legis-

lative pension for service in the legislature prior to the 1961.
The reason that such individuals are receiving legislative

~~

sions for years of service prior to 1961 is that they were
employed by the statP. on July l

1961 and had rendered service to

the state for a 90-day period between June 30
1961.

1960 and July L

The plaintiffs were not given pensions because they faiied

to meet these two requirements (R.
5.

74).

The plaintiffs were refused benefits on the ground

that formal service credit is a prerequisite to eligibility under
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sec tl on 49-10-36 and that the plaintiffs did not have that formal
credit for having served

in the legislature prior to 1961 (R. 74).
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
FORMER LEGISLATORS WHO HAVE SERVED FOUR
OR MORE YEARS IN THE UTAH LEGISLATURE
UPON REACHING THE AGE OF 65 ARE ENTITLED
TO RECEIVE A LEGISLATIVE PENSION WITHOUT
REGARD TO THE FORMAL CONCEPTS OF SERVICE
CREDIT.

Background
In 1971
enactec'l.

the Utah State Retirement Act [1971 Act] was

Laws of Utah, 1971 Session

the Utah Public Employees'

Chapter 111.

It repealed

Retirement Act which provided retire·

ment, disability and death benefits to many of the officers and
employees of the state. counties, cities, and other political
subdivisions.
Section 2.

See Laws of Utah, 1961 Session, Chapter 100,

The 1971 Act also (1) createc'l a Governor's and

Legislative Service Pension Division,

(2) provided that the

funding of benefits for the governor's and legislative pensions
would come from annual appropriations from the general fund (as
opposed to individual trust accounts from contributions) and (3)
allowed a legislative pension to any member who has credit for
four or more years of service as a legislator in the Utah
legislature in an amount of only $10.00 per month for each ~ar
of service as a member of the legislature.

Laws of Utah, 1971

Session, Chapter 111, Section 6.
A 1975 amendment to the 1971 Act (1) added an ope~
ended funding provision authorizing the state director of finance
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1

W •actuarially fund the cost of the pensions and benefits autho-

rized and being paid" through the governor's and legislators
pension division "during the forthcoming year", and (2) added a
~spital and medical payment plan for members of the legislature,

and retired and inactive members with four or more years of

I

legislative service credit.

Laws of Utah, 1975 Session. Chapter

146, Section 6.

In summary

the 1971 Act created a separate "governor's

anrl legislative service pension division of the Utah State enploymen t sys tern

. with the funding of benefits •

. being

underwritten by annual appropriations from the general fund."
Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-36 (Supp. 1979).

The le9islative service

pension is separate from and in addition to normal employee
retirement benefits.

Unlike the normal retirement benefits which

ue funded by employee/employer contributions to individual trust
~counts

(Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-10-20 and 49-10-21 (1970 and Supp.

1979)), the legislative pension is funded by "annual appropri-

ations from the general fund."

Defendants' Argument and Issue
Defendants'

justification for the denial of legislative

pensions to plaintiffs is founded on the following line of argu~ents;

(1) the language in section 49-14-36(2) which speaks of

"credit for four or more years of service as a legislator" refers
1

to the formal, technical "service credit" defined by section 49-

1

lO-lG ("current service credit") and section 49-10-17 ("prior
5

'rv1ce credit");

(2) since plaintiffs' service was rendered
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prior to 1961. they had "prior service credit" under the cur

rent

1971 Act only to the extent they had "creditable service" under
the predecessor 1961 Act (see Utah Code Ann.§ 49-10-17(a)(l));
and (3) the plaintiffs had no "creditable service" under the
predecessor Act for the pre-1961 service in the legislature
because former section 49-1-49 of the 1961 Act allowed credit for
service rendered prior to 1961 only if an employee were

eng~~

in covered employment as of July 1, 1961, and neither plaintiff
was so employed as of July 1

1961.

Session, Chapter 100, Section 18 ( 1)

See Laws of Utah

1961

[hereafter and heretofore

"1961 Act" l.
The first leg of defendants'justification argument and
the controlling issue in this case, is whether the language of
section 39-·10-36 referring to "credit for four or more years of
service" means formal, technical "service credit" as defined in
sections 49-10-16 and 49-10-17.

This is purely a question of

statutory construction, and it is ultimately the Court's province
and duty to construe laws enacted by the legislature.

Broad Construction Needed
In construing a statute the fundamental judicial concern is to effectuate the intent of the legislature.

Johnson v.

State Tax Comr.iission, 17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831, 832 (1966).
This includes judicial deference to the legislative intent
regarding the breadth of statutory construction.

The legislature

has expressed a general intent that statutory provisions "are to
be liberally cons trued with a view to e £feet the obi" ts vf the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

statutes and to promote justice."
(197 8) •

Moreover

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2

the legislature has expressed its specific

intent with regard to construction of the 1971 Act:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
legislature that this act be liberally construed so that the benefits and protections
as herein provided shall be extended as
broadly as reasonably possible.
Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-7 ( 1970).

Plaintiffs urge the Court to

res~ct

these legislative expressions of intent by construing

~ction

49-10-36 so that the benefits of the legislative pension

"shall be extended as broadly as reasonably possible."
It is "the well-established rule that statutes will not
be severed and considered piecemeal, but must be given effect in
their entirety whenever possible."
14 Utah 2d 63

Peay v. Board of Education,

377 P.2d 490, 492 (1962).

And "where there is

doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of terms,

they should be

analyzed in the light of the total context" of the statute.
Crist v. Bishop, 520 P.2d 196, 198 (Utah 1974).
~nsion

The legislative

provisions, therefore, must be analyzed in light of the

total 1971 Act.
It is equally well settled that the plain and literal
~~ing

of a statute is the foundational intrinsic evidence of

legislative intent:
[A] statute should not be • . . applied other
than in accordance with its literal wording
unless it is so unclear or confused as to be
wholly beyond reason or inoperable, or ~t
contravenes some basic constitutional right.
~lt Lake City

20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (1967).

tlhen the construction involves "technical words and phrases"
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which "are def inea by statute,
according to such
nition."

P'~culiar

[they]

are to be construed

and appropriate meaning or defi-

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (1978).

"Service Credit"
a~

Plaintiffs contend that according to the plain

literal terms of the statute the technical term of "service
credit" cannot apply to section 49-10-36.

The 1971 Act

diffe~

entiates between "service credit," which is required of regular
employees covered under the Act, and "credit for years of
service" as applied to legislators.
Sections 49-·10-16 and 49-10-17 of the 1971 Act define
"service cre<iit" in terms of "service" and "covered service".
Section 49-10-6(16) defines "service" and "covered
service" as "service rendered to an employer for compensation
which is included in computations relating to membership status
or benefit rights under this act."

(Emphasis added.)

Also,

"years of service" and "service years" are defined by section

4~

10-6 (19) as designated periods "during which an employee performed services for an employer or employers."

(Emphasis added.I

It is more than noteworthy that the statutory definitions of "service " "covered service," "years of service " and
"service years" all refer only to services performec1 to or for an
"employer".

Section 49-10-6 ( 5) defines an "employer" as "any

department, educational institution or political subdivision for
which any employee or member per[orms services subject to the
provisions of this act."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~
The state legislature does not come within the definition of "department" under section 49-10-6(2), or the definition of "educational institution" under section 49-10-6 ( 3), or
the definition of "political subdivision'' under section 49-10Consequently the term "employer" does not include the

6(4).

state legislature.

"Em pl oye •'"

The fact that the stuatuory definition of "employer"
does not include the state legislature was recognized by the
legislature in its enactment of the 1971 Act.

That is why the

legislature included a twofold definition of "employee" under
section 49-10-6 ( 6).

This section first defines "employees" as

those engaged in a "term of employement for an employer".
(~phasis

added.)

~"employee"
~is

to include "an officer, elective or appointive."

second definition specifically allows members of the Utah

l~islature

Act.

Secondly, this section expands the definition

to exclude themselves from coverage under the 1971

Thus, there can be no question that they are covered as

"off ice rs" uncle r

the second definition.

Hence, the very

existence of the second definition conclusively shows that
rne~bers

of the Utah legislature are not covered by the first

de:1nition which refers to ''employer" or "employers".

(If the

l~islature were an "employer" there would be no need for an

additional definition of "employee" in this section.)

I
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Since the legislature is not considered an "employer"
the technical "service credit" requirements cannot be applicable
to legislators.

According to the literal wording of the statute

legislators cannot perform "service"

"covered service"

"years

of service", or "service years", in the statutory technical
sense, because they do not work for an "employer".
able of rendering "service" or "covered service"

Being incapas defined in

the 1971 Act, legislators therefore cannot acquire any
prior "service credit".

current~

Consequently, if "service credit" isa

prerequisite to legislative pension benefits under section 49-10·
36, no legislator would ever be eligible to receive a legislative
pension.

Surely the legislature could not have intended this

absurd result when it enacted the 1971 Act.
If the legislature had meant to require four or more
years of ''service credit", it could easily and clearly have used
such words.

That it was capable of doing so is clearly mani-

fested by a concluding paragraph of the same section that created
the legislative pension.

It is stated that retired members of

the legislature may participate in a hospital and medical plan
developed by the state retirement office if they have "four or
more years of legislative service credit".
10-36(3)(para. 4)(Supp.1979)

Utah Code Ann.

(Emphasis added).

§

49·

Because similar

language was not used concerning the monthly legislative pension,
the legislature evidenced its intent that formal "service credit"
not be required for legislative pensions.
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In summary

defendants'

~ore years of service"

should

theory that "credit for four or

be construed to mean four or more

technical "service years" of "service credit" is obviously not
supported by the literal wording of the statute.
of ac~endants'
1

1

argument would create internal contradictions in

the plain wording of the 1971 Act.
~ve

The acceptance

This inconsistency would not

been the intent of the legislature which unequivocally

intended to provide benefits for former legislators in as broad a
scope as

r~asonably

possible.

Plaintiffs suggest instead that "credit for four or
more years of service" shoul<'I be construed to mean that credit
will be granted i:or all past legislative service and that if a
~mer

legislator has four or more years legislative service, at

age 65 he is eligible for a pension of $10.00 per month for each
year of legislative service.

'I'his construction avoids the judi-

cial creation of internal contradiction in the statute and
exte~cls

bene: its to former legislators "as broadly as reasonably

possible."

Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-7 ( 1970).
Plaintiffs' contruction of the statute is not only

required by a logical

literal, straightforward reading of the

statute itself, but it also guarantees a reasonable.- practicable,
~iform

application of statutory benefits.

Since the number of

former legislators over age 65 is necessarily limited, and
~cause the legislative pension is funded almost exclusively by

special appropriation from the general fund, and because the
~ 0 ns1on itself

is nominal in amount, this construction of the
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statute would not result in uncontrollable, unlimited pension
claims or jeopardize the public fisc.

No Intent to Discriminate Unjustly
Plaintiffs' construction is also required in

order~

avoid the unjust and cliscriminatory consequences that flow from
defendants'

interpretation of the statute.

Assuming arguendo

that the technical "service credit" requirements apply to

le~is-

lative pensions, the statute would unjustly discriminate between

1

pre-1961 legislators who Here employed under "covered services"
of the 1961 Act as of July 1, 1961
were not.

ana pre-1961 legislators

w~

Former section 49-1-49 of the 1961 Act allowed credit

for pre-1961 service only if the employee were employed by a
covered employer as of July 1

1961.

Thus, if a pre-1961

legislator were in any way a covered employee -- legislative or
non-legislative

as of July 1

1961

ana hacl rendered at least

90 days service between June 30, 1960, and July 1

1961, all his

former legislative service could he claimed as prior service
credit under the 1961 Act.

His prior legislative service could

be bootstrapped to his then current employement
unrelatea to legislative service.

even if totally

In contrast, a pre-1961 legis-

la tor who happened to be in private employment not covered by thi
1961 Act as of July 1, 1961

could not acquire any credit for his
'

I

prior years of legislative service.
In short, under defendants'

theory, credit for pre-19 61

j

::: i::::::: :::::::e:e::n::c :~: i:r ':::::c::m::::::~ :::::::,::, I
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____j

former legislator happened to be covered under the 1961 Act in
~me capacity as of July l

1961.

A legislature which enacted a

special provision to benefit "as broadly as reasonably possible"
its former members cannot have intended an unequal. 0 iscrimi1

natory result based on the unsubstantial clistinction of place of
employment as of July 1, 1961.
An intent to discriminate unjustly between different
cases of the same kind or to produce incongruous results is not

, tobc= ascribeCl to the legislature.
254, 390 P.2d 915

916 (1964).

115 So. 2d 147 (1959).

Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d

Kellum v. Johnson

237 Miss. 580,

And where the statute is anbiguous,

"courts will strive to avoid an interpretation imputing a design
to distinciuish between cases upon a course of reasoning too
unsubstantial and too finely drawn for regulation of human
action, or producing arbitrary or incongruous results, or an
anomalous, capricious, or senseless distinction or discrimination

or an unequal opera ti on generally."

Statutes § 261

7 3 Am. Jur. 2d

( 1974).

This unjust and unreasonable dichotomy produced by
deiendants'

interpretation exists not only in theory but in the

actual practice of the Utah State Retirement Board.

Defendants

stipulatea that former legislators, some of whom served concurrently with plaintiffs, and all of whom served prior to 1961,
ha 11 e received and arc now receiving legislative pension benefits
~rsuant

to section 49-10-36, merely because they were employed

~an employer covereCl by the 1961 Act as of July 1, 1961.

stipulation alone is evidence that defendants'

This

interpretation of
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the statute is erroneous

in that it ascribes to the legisl t
a ure

an intent to discrimin0te on the basis of an unsubstantial clistinction.

Other Plans
Not Affected
-------Deiendants sug']est incorrectly that the trial court's
reason in'] will apply with equal force to all public employees.
Such is not the case.

Section 49-10-36 provides retirement

benefits for the elected officials -- legislators and governors.
For all other public employees (those whose existence in

sta~

government aoes not depend upon the will of the electorate), the
concepts of service credit come in to play, as demons tratecl by the
following provisions:
Section 49-10-2 4 covers the options of an employee

1.

who ceases to be employed in "covered services" for an employer
for reasons other than retirement, permanent or temporary disability

or death.
2.

Section 49-10-31 specifies the requirements for a

service retirement which depend upon age and the number of years
of "service", which is service rendered to an employer for compensation.

Utah Code Ann.

§

49-10-6(1G)(Supp. 1979).

The

various plans for service retirement provide pensions based upon
"prior service" and "current service", which again relate to
services provided to employers.
16, 17, 6(16)

(1970

&

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-10-32,

Supp. 1979).

Hence, these general benefit sections apply expressly
tc all "employees" of "employers", thus including the workers
th(' following:
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o:

1.
Any "department" which means any
"department, office, board, commission,
instrumentality or other agency of the state
of Utah."
Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-6(5), (2)
(1970).

2.
Any "educational institution" which means
a "political subdivision or instrumentality
of the state or of a political subdivision .
. . primarily engaged in educational
activities or the administration or servicing
thereof .
Utah Code Ann. § 49-106(5), ( 3) (1970).
3.
Any "political subdivision" which
includes "educational institutions, cities,
towns, counties, leagues or associations
thereof or associations of the Utah public
employees . . . mos~uito abatement districts,
sewer or water districts, water associations
and companies, libraries, and any consolidation .
Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-6(5),
(4) (1970 & Supp. 1979).
The employees of such entities would not be affected in any way
by the court's ruling

statute

in this case.

By the plain meaning of the

the t<?chnical concepts involving "service credit" apply

to such employees.
Moreover

the ruling has no apparent effect upon the

other retirement systems referred to by the defendants.
1.

The Utah Public Safety Retirement Act (Utah Code

Ann. §§ 49-11-1 et seq.) provides retirement benefits for all
~ployees

engaged full time in public safety work.

Ann.§ 49-11-1

(1970).

Utah Code

An employee in public safety work

qualifies for a service retirement if he meets certain criteria,
which relate to the employee's age and years of "service".
Code Ann.§ 49-11-34 (1970).

Utah

"Service" is defined to mean

"public safety service" rendered to an "employer" for compensat1on.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-8 ( 15)

( 1970).

"Public safety
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s~rvice"

means service relating to hazardous duty, including

duties perforr.ted by "municipal policerien, county sheriffs a 11 ct
deputies, state highway pa trolr.ten, law enforcement officers in
the public safety departr.ient" and the like.
11-8(14)

(1970).

Utah Coile Ann.

§

49

_

An ''employer" is "any department or divisiono;

the state or political subdivision for which any employee or
member performs services subject to this act."
49-11-8 ( 5)

( 1970).

Utah Coile Ann.

1

Clearly, there is no question that public

service employees can perform the covered "service" necessary lor:
their retirement benefits.

There is nothing that prevents appli-

cation of the concepts of "service credit" found in sections 4911-18 through 49-11-20.
2,
§§

The Utah Firemen's Retirer.ient Act (Utah Code Ann.

49-6a-l et seq.)

ruling.

is similarly not affected by the court's

A fireman or volunteer fireman qualifies for the

retirement benefits of this Act i f he has attained the requisite
age ana accur.iulated the specifie<i years of "service".
Ann. § 49-6a-27 (1970).

"Service" is defined to mean "fireman

service" renderer] an ''employer" for compensation.
§

49-6a-4(11)

(1970).

(1970).

Utah Code Ann,

"Fireman service'' r.1eans service rendered

to a regularly constituted fire department.
6a-4(10)

Utah Code

Utah Code Ann.§ 49·

An "employer" is "any regularly constituted

fire department for which any employee or member performs
services subject to this act."
(1970).

Again

Utah Corie Ann. § 49-6a-4(5)

there is not question that a fireman is capable

of performing "service" for which he accumulates crerlit toward
retirement

b~nefits.

.
(Utah Ca~
The concepts of "service
ere a·t"
1
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1

49-6a-11.

Ann.§§

-12 (1970)) will apply to him, unaffected by

the court's rulin<J.
3.

The Utah Judges' Retirement Act (Utah Code Ann. §§

49-7a-l et seq.)

is constructed in essentially the same manner.

A j~ge qualifies for a service retirement at age 70 or 65 if he
~she has at least 6 or 10 years of "service"

utah Co<ie Ann. § 49-7a-25 ( 1970).

respectively.

"Service" in this Act is

definP.d as "service rendered to the employer for compensation
Utah Code Ann. § 49-7a-7(9)
means the State of Utah.
once again

(1970).

The word "employer"

Utah Code Ann. § 49-7a-7(2) (1970).

it is clear that the covered employee, in this case a

J~ge,

can perform the "service" for which he or she accumulates

cr~dit

toward retirement benefits, and the concepts of "service

credit" (Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-7a-12 to -14 (1970)) apply.

The

ruling in this case will have no effect upon these qualifications.
In the case of jud<Jes (section 49-7a-26), firemen
(~ction

49-6a-28), public service employees (section 49-11-35),

and employees of

"employers" under the Utah State Retirement Act

(section 49-10-32), the retirement allowance for a service
~tirement

is a function of a final average monthly salary and

the number of years of service credit.

legislator

In the case of a state

who is covered by a special division under provisions

dissimilar to those above, the pension provided is $10. 00 per
~n~ of service as a member of
§ 49-10-36(2)

(Supp. 1979).

the legislature.

Utah Code Ann.

No mention is made of "service

cr.,rli t". Nor shoulil the typical pattern of final average monthly
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salary times the years of service credit be expected in the

case

of a legislator, who is elected for a relatively short term,
whose "salary" does not progress as it does for a career
employee, and whom the state cannot entice to stay in his
"position" for future credit years by the promise of a large
retirement allowance.
The defendants' prophecy of financial doom for the many
retirement systems operated by the state is clearly unfounded.
The holcling in the case is limited to legislators.
allowance is very small.

The monthly

The nunber of: former legislators having

served four or more years, and the number of years that they have
serve<l is not difficult to determine
ficulty in fund administration.

1

thereby creating no dif-

It is believed that the number

of living, former legislators who qualify for a legislative
pension is quite small.

The public fisc

is not endangered.

I
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I

POINT II:

DOCTRINES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THAT INVOLVr::
EXTRANEOUS MATTERS HAVE NO APPLICATION WHI::RE THE
MEANING OF THI:: STATUTE UNDI::R CONSIDERATION IS
NOT AMBIGUOUS.
The defendants contend that the Court should give some

consideration to the fact that the r::xecutive Director of the Utah
I

state Retirement Board decided in 1973 that the plaintiffs are
not entitled to a legislative pension because they do not have
enough "service crenit" to qualify.

The claim is that the

legislature has acquiesced in this administrative construction of
the law by failing to amena the language of the legislator's
~nsion

10gislation.

These arguments should fail to effect the

court's contrary construction for several reasons.
First

it is not clear at all from defendants' brief

(p. 11) what the terms were of the proposed amenda tory
legislation governing pensions for leg isl a tors.

Defendants

desire the Court to take judicial notice of two bills and one
"bill" that was never introduced without providing complete
specifications of their terms.

From the limited exposition on

these bills, it would appear that their purpose was to clarify
th~

existing law rather than to change its intended meaning.

Mternpting to clarify an unambiguous statute for the benefit of
m intransiqent administrator so as to say "Yes, we really mean
it" does not express a message other than that the statute means

exactly what it says.

I

Second, there is no need to revert to an administrative
construct1on because the statute speaks unambiguously for itself·
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Indeed

giving any weight to an administrative hunch as to the

meaning of an unambi<Juous statute is not proper.

An administra-

tive construction can never go against the plain meaning of the
statute.

E.C. Olsen Co. v. Stat<? Tax Conmission

168 P.2d 324, 332,

(1946).

109 Utah 5GJ,

Where a statute is not uncertain in

its meaning there is no need to consider an administrative
construction, even if it is a correct interpretation.

-

Lockhead

Aircraft Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 566 P.2d 1249 (Utah
1977).
In other words, an error in the construction of a
statute by an administrator will not bind a court to his
erroneous view.

Lewis v. Utah State Tax Commission, 118 Utah?:

218 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1950)

(members of commission erroneously

stated exemption applied): Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 107 Utah 24, 151 P.2d 467,

470-71 (1944) (Commission

erroneously concluded "name bands" not covered by unemployment
compensation).

A case of great importance in this regard is McPhie v
Industrial Commission, 567 P. 2d 153 (Utah 1977), where this Cou
held that the Industrial Commission erroneously denied certain
lifetime benefits to an injured workman based upon its improper
construction of the pertinent sections of the compensation
statutes.

The Court reco<Jnizec] its "duty" to correct a miscon·

struction or misapplication of a statute by administrators.
P. 2d at 155.

~

The Court also recognized a rule of construction

applicable to workers' compensation benefit statutes:
A further equally recognized rule of
construction resolves any doubt respecting
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the right of compensation in favor of the
injured employee or his dependents, as the
case may be, and the compensation statutes
should be liberally construed in favor of
recovery.
l67 p.2d at 155 (Emphasis added).
~mmission

The Court found that the

failed to properly consider this rule of construction.

The matter was remanded for the purpose of making the appropriate
award.
In the case of Mr. Cannon and Mr. Brewster, the Court
should follow the same course of reasoning.

The legislature

, created a benefit statute for the protection of the aged and
infirm, not unlike the protection provided for injured workers,
anil in so doing

expressly declared its policy that;

This act be liberally construed so that the
benefits and protections as herein provided
shall be extended as broadly as reasonably
possible.
Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-7 (1970).
~licy

(Emphasis added).

It is this

that the Retirement Board failed to recognize, and the

trial court correctly remedied the error.
A case of similar import is Utah Hotel Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 107 Utah 24
~e

151 P.2d 467 (1944), where

Court found that the "so-called regulation" under consider-

at1on was nothing more than an "initial guess" as to what the
statute means.

Accorcling to the Court:

"Thus although as a practical or procedural
matter an administrative agency must venture
a decision upon such a question of law, such
questions are always open for independent
judgment of an appropriate court acting
iudicially * * *.
And a binding decision on
a simple iudicial question, such as a
question of statutory construction, may only
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be made by an appropriate court acting
judicially."
151 P.2d at 470.

The Court further stated that it would not

allow an erroneous construction to stand because its effect would
be to amend the statute
Third

151 P.2d at 472.

it makes no difference how long a legislature

may be said to have acquiesced in an administrative construction

if such construction is not in conformity with the plain meaning '
of the statute.
Com1.1ission.

For example,

19 Utah 2d 92

in Union Pacific R.R. v. State Tax

426 P.2d 231

(1967), it appeared that

for 22 years the Commission had interpreted a statute so as to
exempt railroads from paying a sales and use tax on its fuel o!l,,
The Court

rc~i:used

to consider the administrative construction anc

the "acquiescence" of the legislature because it found no ambiguity in the statute involved.

According to the Court:

[N]o matter how long the usage has been
established or how general the acquiesence
in the customary construction, it will not be
permitted to override the plain meaning of a
statute
4 2 6 P . 2d at 2 3 3.
To the same effect is Alexander v. Bennett

5 Utah 2d

163, 298 P.2d 823 (J.956), where from 1939 to 1956 there had been
Attorney General opinions which had been followed by the Department of Registration to the effect that naturopathic physicians
could use drugs and perform minor surgery.

The Court refused to

consider these opinions, stating that the interpretations have
not been long acquiescecl in and that the statutes in guest1onare,
not ambiguous.
The plaintif (s assert that the language

o~
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1

tive pt·nsion statute is unambiguous in requiring that the
plaintiffs receive a pension and that it is not proper to consirler the allcc:ied construction placed upon the statute by the
~rninistrator
~rceived,

for only six years.

If any doubt in meaning is

we submit that such doubt should be resolved in favor

of the plaintiffs to effect the policy of the legislature that

the act be liberally construed so that bene!:its be extended as
broadly as reasonably possible.

EI
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs ask the Court to affirm the court below in
ruling that the phrase "credit for four or more years of service
in the l<"gislature" contemplates the awardin') of credit for all
past legislative service and provides a legislative pension for
all former legislators havin<J the requisite "four or more years
of service."

Plaintiffs submit that defendants' attempt to

equate "credit for four or more years of service" with the
technical terms of "service credit" and "service years" is
unwarranb"d by th<> plain and literal wording of the statute and
produces internal contradictions within the statutory scheme.
Moreoever

defendants'

interpretation inevitably leads to un-

justly ciiscriminatory and incongruous results, as evidenced by
the stipulated current practices of defendants.
The unequivocal legislative intent was to establish a
special "governor's and legislative service pension division of
the Utah State employment system .

underwritten by annual

appropriations from the general fund."
36.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-

Furthermore, the l<:>g islature clearly intended that the 1911

Act "be liberally construed so that the benefits and protections
[therein] provided shall be extended as broadly as reasonably
possible."

Id. § 49-10-7.

Extending the legislative pension

bene:::its to all former legislators

regardless of their place of
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employment on July l
blC

i

1961 · is, without doubt, reasonably possi-

both financially and administratively.
DATED this

31sr

Clay of October. 1979.

~CQ"uJ.
DAVID A. WESTERBY,

Jl.J1211J~

ES~

RICHARD R. NESLEN, ESQ.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
330 South Thirr'l East
Salt Lake City Utah 84111
(801) 521-3680
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